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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
DOUGLAS LEE CURTIS, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
HARMON ELECTRONICS, INC., 
Defendant, 
and 
THE DENVER & RIO GRANDE Case No. 14354 
WESTERN RAILROAD, 
Defendant and Third-
Party Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. 
DeWAYNE CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, 
Third-Party 
Defendant-Respondent. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
DeWAYNE CONSTRUCTION COMPANY 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This is a third-party action for contribution or 
indemnity by Denver & Rio Grande Western Railroad (here-
inafter called D&RG) against DeWayne Construction Company 
(hereinafter called DeWayne) arising out of aji auto^ trajji 
collision. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The lower court granted summary judgment in favor 
of DeWayne dismissing the Third-Party Complaint. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
DeWayne seeks affirmance of the judgment of the 
lower court, 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This lawsuit arises out of an accident that 
occurred on October 21, 1973, in Salt Lake County, at 
the crossing of 90th South Street by the D&RG Railroad, 
At this time, a truck in which plaintiff was a passenger, 
was struck by a train operated by the D&RG. (R. 1-5). 
Plaintiff alleges that the D&RG was negligent in the opera-
tion of the train and crossing signals. (R. 8-10, 13-14). 
D&RG alleges and DeWayne admits at the time of the colli-
sion that the truck involved therein was owned by DeWayne 
and was being operated by one of DeWayne1s employees in 
the scope of his employment for DeWayne. 
The plaintiff, a passenger in said truck, was at 
the time of the accident also in the scope of his employ-
ment and has been paid workmen's compensation benefits by 
DeWayne. 
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The D&RG alleges that if plaintiff is entitled to 
recover anything, DeWayne is liable to the D&RG for such 
recovery under the theory of Respondeat Superior. (R. 16-
17). Accordingly, D&RG is seeking to recover in the 
third-party action for contribution or indemnity. 
The undisputed facts show that plaintiff has collected 
the sum of $6,599.89 in workmen's compensation from DeWayne 
Construction (R. 92-9 3) and that the driver of DeWayne's 
truck was killed in the accident and that his representa-
tive has not been joined in this action. 
The D&RG does not allege any formal, written in-
demnity agreement between it and DeWayne. 
DeWayne finds no basis in the record £Q£ any addi-
tional representations of the plaintiff or other witnesses 
as outlined in Appellant's Statement of Facts and on that 
ground, objects to them. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I; THE WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT RELIEVES 
DeWAYNE CONSTRUCTION COMPANY FROM ANY AND ALL 
OTHER CIVIL LIABILITY TO THE PLAINTIFF OR TO THE 
DENVER & RIO GRANDE WESTERN RAILROAD. 
Section 35-1-60, Utah Code Annotated, provides: 
35-1-60. Exclusive remedy against employer, 
or officer, agent or employee—Occupational 
disease excepted.—The right to recover com-
pensation pursuant to the provisions of this 
title for injuries sustained by an employee, 
3 
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whether resulting in death or not, shall 
be the exclusive remedy against the em-
ployer and shall be the exclusive remedy 
against any officer, agent or employee of 
the employer and the liabilities of the 
employer imposed by this act shall be in 
place of any and all other civil liability 
whatsoever, at common law or otherwise, to such 
employee or to his spouse, widow, children, 
parents, dependents, next of kin, heirs, 
personal representatives, guardian, or any 
other person whomsoever, on account of any 
accident or injury or death, in any way 
contracted, sustained, aggravated or in-
curred by such employee in the course of or 
because of or arising out of his employment, 
and no action at law may be maintained against 
an employer or against any officer, agent or 
employee of the employer based upon any acci-
dent, injury or death or an employee. Nothing 
in this section, however, shall prevent an 
employee (or his dependents) from filing a 
claim with the industrial commission of Utah 
for compensation in those cases within the 
provisions of the Utah Occupational Disease 
Disability Act, as amended, (emphasis added). 
The foregoing statute makes it clear that payment of 
workmen's compensation by DeWayne to an employee is in lieu 
of all other civil liability of DeWayne to the plaintiff 
or the D&RG. The Workmen's Compensation Act makes it clear 
that no action at common law in tort can be maintained 
against DeWayne based upon any injury to the plaintiff. 
DeWayne has made payments to plaintiff as prescribed 
by the Workmen's Compensation Act in the sum of $6,599,89. 
Section 35-1-60 is clear and unambiguous. The payment of 
workmen's compensation by DeWayne relieves it from any and 
and all other civil liability whatsoever. 
4 
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The purpose of the Workmen*s Compensation Act has 
been outlined by this Court in many cases. In Cook v. 
Peter Kiewit Sons Co., 15 U.2d 20, 386 P.2d 616 (1963), 
the Court stated: 
.
 0 . the philosophy behind the Workmenls 
Compensation Act encompasses two main ob-
jectives. The first is to assure that an 
employee who is injured in employment will 
have necessary medical and hospital care 
and modest but certain compensation for his 
injury, with resulting benefits to himself, 
his family and to society generally; the 
other is to afford employers a measure of 
protection against exorbitant claims for 
injuries. . . . 
* * * 
. . . it permits employers to pay fees for 
workmen's compensation insurance thereby 
safeguard themselves against possible 
disastrous claims for injuries which they 
may not be able to bear. This allows em-
ployers to so plan and manage their affairs 
as to make the wheels of industry run, with 
its resulting benefits, including jobs for 
employees. Both the giving of full effect 
to the act, and doing justice to the em-
ployer, require that it be so interpreted 
and applied as to afford the employer the 
intended protection as well as conferring 
the advantages it does upon the employee. 
(emphasis added). 
In this case, the D&RG is seeking to make an addi-
tional recovery from DeWayne of any sum it may be required 
to pay plaintiff. Such a demand violates not only the ex-
press terms of the Act but the spirit and philosophy upon 
which the Workmen's Compensation Act is based. 
5 
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DeWayne was required to pay compensation for in-
juries to the plaintiff without showing of any fault. It 
is entitled to have the Workmen's Compensation Act applied 
even-handedly and to have its liability limited by the 
Workmen?s Compensation Act. 
POINT II; AS THE DENVER & RIO GRANDE WESTERN 
RAILROAD AND DeWAYNE CONSTRUCTION COMPANY HAVE 
NO COMMON LIABILITY TO PLAINTIFF, CONTRIBUTION 
IS NOT RECOVERABLE. 
On the date of the accident, Section 78-27-39, Utah 
Code Annotated, was in effect. This statute provides; 
78-27-39. Contribution among joint tort-
feasors—Discharge of common liability by 
joint tort-feasor required.—(1) The 
right of contribution shall exist among 
joint tort-feasors, but a joint tort-feasor 
shall not be entitled to a money judgment 
for contribution until he has, by payment, 
discharged the common liability or more 
than his prorata share thereof, (emphasis added) 
Section 78-27-40(3) provides: 
(3) As used in this section, "joint tort-
feasor" means one of two or more persons, 
jointly or severally liable in tort for the 
same injury to person or property, whether 
or not judgment has been recovered against 
all or some of them. 
The D&RG and DeWayne have no common liability to the 
plaintiff. DeWayne's liability is established by the 
Workmen's Compensation Act; the D&RG's liability will be 
in tort, if any, outside the Workmen's Compensation Act. 
DeWayne has paid workmen's compensation to plaintiff and 
cannot be liable again for any sum whatsoever. 
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As the D&RG and DeWayne have no common liability, 
there is no right of contribution. As defined, they are 
not joint tort-feasors. 
Employers Mutual Liability Insurance Company of 
Wisconsin v. Griffin Construction Company, 280 S.W.2d 179, 
53 A.L.R.2d 967 (Ky. 1955) is a leading case. In this case, 
an employee of the defendant employer was injured on the 
job and received workmen's compensation benefits from his 
employer. The employer later sued a third party for in-
juries and made a recovery. The third party sought con-
tribution against the employer. In denying contribution, 
the Kentucky Court said: 
The decisive question on this phase of the 
case is whether or not liability exists on 
the ground of contribution between joint 
tort-feasors. Here the plaintiff's claim 
meets an insurmountable obstacle. Such 
obstacle is that plaintiff and defendant 
were not joint tort-feasors as to the em-
ployee or his representatives. . . . 
The allegations of the petition are that 
it was through the joint negligence of 
the plaintiff and the defendant that the 
latter's employee was killed. Admitting 
joint negligence, it is clear there was 
no joint liability. 
The authorities appear overwhelming to the 
effect that the doctrine of contribution 
is based upon a common liability to the 
injured party. . . . 
* * * 
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It is clear that the Workmen's Compensation 
Act extinguishes the liability of the em-
ployer to the employee for negligence of 
the former. See Davis v. Solomon, Ky 1955, 
267 SW 2d 674. Plaintiff argues that the 
employee's common law cause of action was 
not extinguished but that his remedy was 
suspended by the Act. This is simply a 
play upon words. If the employee cannot 
recover damages for negligence of the em-
ployer, there is no liability of the em-
ployer, and consequently there could be no 
common liability with a third party. An 
employer operating under the Act cannot be 
a joint tort-feasor with a third party who 
injures his employee. . . . 
There is substantial authority to the effect 
that an employer paying workmen's compensa-
tion may not be called upon by a third party 
for contribution, even though the employer 
was negligent, because the common liability 
does not exist. . . . (At 975). 
Section 78-27-39, Utah Code Annotated, requires 
common liability as a prerequisite to the maintenance of 
an action for contribution. DeWayne, through workmen's 
compensation, has discharged any and all liability to 
plaintiff. The plaintiff cannot recover from DeWayne. 
If the plaintiff cannot recover damages from DeWayne, 
there is no liability on DeWayne's part and thus, no common 
liability as required by the contribution statute. 
The general rule is that an employer whose con-
curring negligence contributed to injure an employee 
cannot be sued for contribution. 
8 
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Section 76.21, Larson, The Law of Workmengs 
Compensation (1970), states: 
The great majority of jurisdictions have 
held that the employer whose concurring 
negligence contributed to the employee's 
injury cannot be sued or joined by the 
third-party as a joint tort-feasor, 
whether under contribution statutes or 
at common law. The ground is a simple 
one: the employer is not jointly liable 
to the employee in tort; therefore he 
cannot be a joint tort-feasor. The lia-
bility that rests upon the employer is an 
absolute liability irrespective of negli-
gence, and this is the only kind of lia-
bility that can devolve upon him whether 
he is negligent or not. The claim of the 
employee against the employer is solely for 
statutory benefit; his claim against the 
third person is for damages. The two are 
different in kind and cannot resolve in a 
common liability. . 
In a similar case, Beal v. Southern Union Gas 
Company, 304 P.2d 566, 62 N.M. 38 (1956), the Supreme 
Court of New Mexico sustained the dismissal of a third-
party action for contribution. In this case two em-
ployees of Clyde Coe were injured while installing sewer 
lines in the City of Albuquerque. Each received workmen's 
compensation benefits from his employer. The employers 
later filed separate suits against Southern Union Gas 
alleging negligence on its part in permitting dangerous 
quantities of gas to accumulate and escape causing the 
explosion that injured them. Thereafter, the Gas Company 
9 
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brought a third-party complaint against Clyde Coe for con-
tribution. The New Mexico Workmen's Compensation Act is 
restrictive like the Utah Workmen's Compensation Act and 
provides that an employer who is covered by the Act cannot 
be subject to any other liability whatsoever for the death 
or personal injury of any employee except as provided in 
the Act; it further provides that such employer shall not 
be liable to the employee or any other person as a result 
of the injury. In affirming the dismissal, the Court said: 
Our tortfeasors' contribution act is 
applicable only in instances where joint 
tortfeasors share a common liability. . . . 
The limitation of employer's liability for 
injuries sustained by an employee covered 
by the Workmen's Compensation Act covers 
all instances where that injury is sought 
to be made the basis for further and addi-
tional liability by the employee or others 
in his behalf, and indirect liability for 
such injury is also foreclosed both by the 
terms of the act and because the employer's 
liability for such injury is not in tort. 
The authorities relied upon by appellant 
are distinguishable as arising under less 
restrictive limitation provisions or in-
volving some relationship between the 
third party and the employer independent of 
joint negligence. Insofar as they may 
declare a contrary rule, however, we will 
not follow them. 
The Utah Workmen's Compensation Act, like the New 
Mexico Act, is explicit and definitive and makes it clear 
10 
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that only one shot can be had against an employer by 
the employee or anyone else for injury to the employee• 
In Pacheco v. Hilo Electric Light Company, Ltd., 
520 P.2d 62 (Ha. 1974), the Supreme Court of Hawaii 
similarly dismissed a third-party complaint for contribu-
tion. In this case, an employee sued a third party for 
negligence and the third party sued the employer for con-
tribution. The Hawaiian Court said the employer, having 
already made payment under the Workmen's Compensation Act, 
was not subject to any further liability and stated that 
the Workmen's Compensation Act totally and unequivocally 
precluded any contribution being recovered from the em-
ployer. 
As it is clear, the D&RG and DeWayne have no common 
liability, they are not joint tort-feasors and contribu-
tion cannot be recovered by the D&RG. 
POINT III; THE WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT 
BARS ALL CLAIMS OF THE DENVER & RIO GRANDE 
WESTERN RAILROAD FOR INDEMNITY. 
As appellant does not contend there is a written 
contract of indemnity between DeWayne and it, appellant's 
claim, if any, must arise on an implied contract of in-
demnity. 
11 
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In Royal Indemnity Company v. Southern California 
Petroleum Corporation, 353 P.2d 358, 67 N.M. 137 (1960), 
two workers were killed and one seriously injured in an 
oil well fire. The three actions were consolidated in one 
suit. B. J. Service Company, the employer of the three 
men, made payment under the Workmen's Compensation Act. 
Royal Indemnity, the insurer of B. J. Service, filed suit 
against Southern California Petroleum Corporation as 
owner of the lease seeking recovery for sums paid by it 
under the Workmen's Compensation Act. Southern California 
Petroleum filed a third-party complaint against B. J. 
Service seeking indemnity on an implied agreement. The 
Court dismissed the third-party claims for indemnity. 
The Court pointed out that New Mexico's Workmen's Com-
pensation Act was definitive and restrictive, like the 
Utah Act, and that it provided that any employer who is 
covered by the Act shall not be subject to any other 
liability whatsoever to any and all persons whomsoever. 
The Court said that in the face of the language of the 
Workmen's Compensation Act, an implied agreement to in-
demnify did not exist. The Court said: 
Whether or not a different rule might be 
applied in a case where an employer and a 
third party had specifically contracted for 
indemnity, we need not here decide. Suffice 
it to say that in this case, where reliance 
is placed upon an implied agreement, we do 
12 
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not feel that the position of Southern 
California can be sustained as against the 
strong language of Section 59-10-5, supra. 
If such an agreement to indemnify were to 
be implied, the employer would be obligated 
to pay damages to an injured employee, 
through a third party, over and above the 
amount of compensation fixed by the Act, 
and thus impose the very liability against 
which the Act declared the employer should 
be insulated. This does not appear to be 
the legislative intention, and the court 
will not by decision alter the plain, clear 
language of the legislative enactment. 
In Montoya v. Greenway Aluminum Company, Inc., 519 
P.2d 22, 10 Wash. App. 630 (1974), Montoya, an employee of 
Collator Corporation, was injured while on the job. He re-
ceived scheduled compensation under the Washington's 
Industrial Insurance Act and then sued a third party for 
negligence in his injuries. The third party sued Collator 
Corporation for indemnity. In upholding the decision of 
dismissal of the action, the Supreme Court of Washington 
An indemnity will not exist in this state 
in the face of the Industrial Insurance Act 
in the absence of a contract between the in-
demnitor and indemnitee. Broxson v. Chicago, 
Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pacific R.R., 446 F.2d 
628 (9th Cir. 1971); Tucci & Sons, Inc. v. 
Carl T. Madsen, Inc., supra. The employer may 
ignore the immunity of the Industrial Insurance 
Act and indemnify the third party when the 
parties have independently created such a 
contractual right. It will not exist otherwise. 
* * * 
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The result must be the same under the 
Washington act. The employer cannot be 
burdened with possible liability as a 
joint tort-feasor in the event of injury 
to the employee. The absolute right of 
recovery given to the workman under the 
act regardless of his fault carries with 
it a concomitant right to freedom from suit 
for the employer regardless of fault. The 
liability for fault being removed, it should 
not be reimposed by an allegation of negli-
gence against the employer coming from a 
third party. The rationale behind the 
Washington approach to industrial insurance 
further dictates that the responsibility 
of the employer cannot be imposed upon or 
shared with the third person if the employee 
elects to take under the act. It follows 
that the liability of the third person as 
a tort-feasor may not be placed on the 
immune employer if the employee elects to 
pursue a common law remedy under RCW 
51.24.010. 
Colorado is another state where there is a restrictive, 
definitive Workmen's Compensation Act similar to Utah's. In 
Hilzer v. MacDonald, 454 P.2d 928, 169 Colo. 230 (1969), the 
Court said that where an employee has received workmen's 
compensation, the party against whom he brings a third-
party action has no right of indemnification from the em-
ployer and that there is no cause of action for implied in-
demnity. 
CONCLUSION 
The judgment of the lower court should be affirmed 
because: 
14 
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1. The Workmen's Compensation Act precludes any 
further liability on behalf of DeWayne for injury arising 
to its employee, 
2. The D&RG and DeWayne have no common liability 
and are not joint tort-feasors. 
3. An implied duty to indemnify does not exist in 
view of the explicit, definitive wording of the Workmen's 
Compensation Act precluding any further liability whatso-
ever against the employer. 
DATED this day of March, 1976. 
Respectfully submitted, 
WORSLEY, SNOW & CHRISTENSEN 
BY. 
Raymond M. Berry 
and 
By 
Kim R. Wilson 
700 Continental Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: 5 21-900 0 
Attorneys for Third-Party 
Defendant-Respondent, 
DeWayne Construction Company 
15 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
RECEIVED 
LAW LIBRARY 
SEP 1 7 1976 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY 
J. Reuben Clark Law School 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
